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UNIVERSALIZING FRAUD
PARMIDA ENKESHAFI*
Instead of joining the Mount Rushmore of Gates, Jobs, and
Zuckerberg, [Elizabeth] Holmes will take her place among Bernie
Madoff, Jeffrey Skilling (Enron), [and] Bernie Ebbers (WorldCom).
—Robert Zafft, Forbes Leadership-Strategy Contributor1
The difficulty of giving an adequate definition of fraud has been felt
at all times.
—Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, English judge2

INTRODUCTION
The criminal trial of Elizabeth Holmes has reanimated public
interest in fraud.3 Holmes, once a Silicon Valley prodigy, was charged
with two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and eleven counts
of wire fraud.4 After deliberating for seven days, the jury reached a
verdict,5 finding Holmes guilty on four counts and potentially
subjecting her to 80 years in prison.6
*Copyright @ 2022 Parmida Enkeshafi
J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2022. B.A., University of Maryland,
2018. I want to extend my gratitude to Professor Lisa Griffin, Professor Samuel Buell, Professor
Rebecca Rich, and all those who supported me in writing this piece.
1. Robert Zafft, Theranos: Elizabeth Holmes’s Witting and Unwitting Accomplices,
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertzafft/2021/09/01/theranos-elizabethholmess-witting-and-unitting-accomplices/?sh=181768e569c3 [https://perma.cc/3WC3-SEKY].
2. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 28
(1883).
3. For a comprehensive account of the Holmes story, see JOHN CARREYROU, BAD
BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP (2018).
4. United States v. Holmes, 2021 WL 2044470, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2020)
https://cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/cases-of-interest/usa-v-holmes-et-al/USA-v.Holmes-18-CR-00258-Dkt-469-Third-Sup-Indictment.pdf.
5. Sara Randazzo & Heather Somerville, Elizabeth Holmes Found Guilty on Four Counts,
WALL ST. J. (JAN. 3, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/elizabeth-holmes-trialtheranos?mod=article_inline.
6. If convicted of all counts, Holmes faced a fine of $250,000, plus restitution, for each
count of wire fraud and for each conspiracy count, totaling $2.75 million, excluding restitution.
Holmes was convicted of four counts. Erin Griffith & Erin Woo, Elizabeth Holmes Is Found
TIMES
(Jan.
3,
2022),
Guilty
of
Four
Counts
of
Fraud,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/technology/elizabeth-holmes-guilty.html. Holmes faces up
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Holmes’ guilty verdict, however, seems different than those of her
predecessors.7 Unlike famous fraudsters like Bernie Madoff, Jeffrey
Skilling, and Bernard Ebbers, Holmes was a technology executive,
giving her asylum within the confines of Silicon Valley’s ‘fake it till you
make it’ culture.8 Her conviction puts a ceiling on the realm of
acceptable ‘fake it till you make it’ conduct. “Fraud” is a moving target,
“a legal concept designed to adapt alongside [] evolving behaviors. . . .”9
Sir Edwin Coke observed as much as early as 1601: “If you ask why are
there so many laws, the answer is that fraud ever increases on this
earth.”10
To complicate matters further, fraud is central to a legal concept
that is similarly unstable—white-collar crime.11 Criminal jurisprudence
has struggled to construct a satisfactory definition of “white-collar
crime” since sociologist Edwin H. Sutherland first coined the term in
1939.12 White-collar crime, which is dominated by fraud, has a
significant moral dimension.13

to 20 years for each of the four counts on which she was convicted. Erin Griffin, Elizabeth Holmes
TIMES
(Jan.
12,
2022),
is
set
to
be
sentenced
on
Sept.
26,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/12/technology/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-sentencing.html.
7. See Erin Griffith & Erin Woo, Elizabeth Holmes is found guilty of four counts of fraud,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/technology/elizabeth-holmesguilty.html. (“The verdict stands out for its rarity. Few technology executives are charged with
fraud and even fewer are convicted.”).
8. See Elizabeth Holmes is found guilty on four counts of fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/business/elizabeth-holmes-is-found-guilty-on-four-countsof-fraud.html. (noting the verdict stands out for its rarity on two fronts: Holmes is both a
technology executive and a female); see also Parmy Olson, ‘Fake It Till You Make It’ Will Live
On After Theranos, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/fakeit-till-you-make-it-will-live-on-after-theranos/2022/01/04/555ad7ea-6d91-11ec-b1e20539da8f4451_story.html; Dileep Rao, Fake It Till You Make It: Is This One More Lie From
(Sept.
15,
2021),
Silicon
Valley. . .
Like
Theranos?,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2021/09/15/fake-it-till-you-make-it-is-this-one-more-liefrom-silicon-valley-like-theranos/?sh=2e44c1c5134e.
9. Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011).
10. Twyne’s Case (1601), 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 82a, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 815–16 (K.B.). Sir Edwin
Coke has been dubbed “the most famous and influential legal thinker of the Elizabethan age.”
SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S
CORPORATE AGE 41 (2016).
11. This Note uses “white-collar crime” to refer to crimes including bribery, fraud, perjury,
obstruction of justice, false statements, and insider trading.
12. See EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (1949) (“[V]iolations of
law by persons in the upper socioeconomic class are, for convenience, called ‘white collar
crimes.’”).
13. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501 (2014). (“Much of white collar crime involves conduct that is hard
to define, hard to identify, and hard to prove; yet it is also some of the most harmful conduct our
society faces.”).
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Morality’s role in the law is nothing new.14 But morality—our
understanding of what is wrong and right—is not a concept that
“intertwines comfortably” with white-collar crime.15 Recently, morality
has come to the fore in white-collar offenses;16 “In the white collar
context, conventional mental state tools often do not provide enough
traction to handle the hard cases.”17 Definitionally, fraud “refer[s] to
schemes not just to obtain money or property, but also to achieve any
unjust advantage or to injure the rights or interests of another.”18 Moral
content is central to the broader definition of fraud.19 And beneath the
statutory language lies a simple notion of morality: it is wrong to
deceive another out of their property.20
Because of this moral dimension, the adjudication of white-collar
crimes would benefit from the application of Immanuel Kant’s
universalizability principle.21 To succinctly make this argument, this
Note limits its analysis to the mail and wire fraud statutes.
The purpose of this Note is to show that the traditional degrees of
culpability, either at common law or according to the Model Penal
Code, are insufficient and should be supplanted with a standard based
on Kant’s philosophy. Both the common law and the Model Penal Code
recognize levels of mens rea. At common law, there are five degrees of
mental culpability: intentionally, knowingly, willfully, negligence, and

14. That is not to say that considering an actor’s mental state in the adjudication of whitecollar crimes is a novel concept. In fact, this debate has been taking place for a long time. See
generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
15. Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 453, 454 (2017).
16. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform
the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157 (2001); Samuel W. Buell
& Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133 (2012).
17. Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of
Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 138 (2012).
18. STUART P. GREEN, Fraud, in LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 150 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
19. See id. at 150–51.
20. See John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2006) (“[T]he core of the legal wrong that has
historically been labeled ‘fraud’ or ‘deceit’ is the wrong of interfering with a particular interest of
the victim, namely her interest in making certain kinds of choices in certain settings free from
certain forms of misinformation.”).
21. Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2022)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.
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recklessness.22 According to the Model Penal Code, the levels of mental
culpability are purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.
Although those mental states are adequate for the adjudication of most
crimes, the same cannot be said of white-collar crimes. For the purposes
of this paper, “white-collar crime” refers to the family of offenses that
are malum in se. White-collar crimes are malum in se, as opposed to
malum prohibitum, because of the insistence on requiring proof of a
mental state. In the landmark case Morissette v. United States, Justice
Robert H. Jackson wrote for a unanimous court, holding that acts which
are bad in themselves (i.e., malum in se) require mens rea.23 Therefore,
contemplating white-collar crimes as acts which are bad in themselves
necessitates mens rea as an element of the offense.
Resolving white-collar cases has proven to be a difficult task.
Courts have shifted to using morality to adjudicate white-collar
crimes.24 This shift has occurred because of “a kind of moral complexity
and uncertainty” unifying white-collar crimes.25 Mixing of morality and
black-letter law has convoluted the adjudication of fraud. Jurors, for
instance, are often required to speculate not only about a defendant’s
mental state in the traditional legal sense but also to only convict if they
find the defendant was aware that what she was doing was wrong—a
principle called “consciousness of wrongdoing.”26 A simplified
solution—one that aligns with the flexibility required of fraud statutes
and coheres with the congressional intent behind those statutes—
involves universalizing fraud by relying on Kantian principles.
Part I surveys two aspects of fraud’s legal landscape: the statutory
language and courts’ interpretations of it, proving that consciousness of

22. The Model Penal Code uses similar degrees of culpability: purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1980).
23. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Criminal offenses are either malum in se (“evil in itself”) or malum
prohibitum (“prohibited evil”). Malum in Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Malum
Prohibitum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Malum in se refers to the class of
offenses that are innately immoral, irrespective of any law proscribing it. Malum prohibitum refers
to the class of offenses that are prohibited by statute, while the act itself is not necessarily immoral.
In the legal context, white-collar crimes, as I have defined them, and violent crimes are both mala
in se. For a more philosophical discussion of the principle of mala in se, see Morten Dige,
Explaining the Principle of Mala in Se, 11 J. OF MIL. ETHICS 318–332 (2012).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978) (“[T]he behavior . . . is
often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable
business conduct.”); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 741-42 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing how,
in a fraud case, “the line between merely unattractive and actually criminal conduct is blurred”).
25. Green, supra note 11, at 504.
26. See generally Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness
of Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 138 (2012).
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wrongdoing as the requisite mens rea is a judicial misstep. Then Part II
will explain Kant’s philosophy, in particular his discussion of the
Categorical Imperative. Part III will apply Kant’s philosophy and
design a new framework in an attempt to remedy some shortcomings
of fraud jurisprudence.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND EVOLUTION OF MAIL AND
WIRE FRAUD STATUTES
Consciousness of wrongdoing—the current legal standard in many
jurisdictions—is the misshapen product of statutory ambiguities. The
requisite mens rea for a federal fraud conviction is willfulness.27 “In
each fraud case, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew
what he was doing was illegal.”28 And that culpable intent is often
proven through the defendant’s consciousness of wrongdoing.29 For
example, in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, the Supreme Court
expressly imported consciousness of wrongdoing into the obstruction
of justice statute.30 Yet, without clear guidance as to what consciousness
of wrongdoing entails, the definitional problem of an alleged
defrauder’s mental state persists.31 Thus, demonstrating the difficulty of
interpreting statutes that are so intertwined with morality.
The federal mail fraud statute has outgrown its humble origins.
Enacted in 1872, the statute was initially aimed at protecting the
integrity of the United States Postal Service.32 More specifically, it
27. LEONARD SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A.
REISS & NANCY BATTERMAN, 2 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CRIMINAL ¶ 44.01 (2021) (“‘Willfully’ means to act knowingly and purposely, with an intent to
do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the
law.”).
28. Tai H. Park, The “Right To Control” Theory of Fraud: When Deception Without Harm
Becomes a Crime, 43 CARDOZO LAW REV. 135, 194 (2021).
29. Id.
30. 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Bertram, 900 F.3d 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2018) (“More specifically,
the omission of a material fact with the intent to get the victim to take an action he wouldn’t
otherwise have taken establishes intent to defraud under the wire statute.”); United States v.
Faruki, 803 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Intent to defraud requires a willful act by the defendant
with the specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for
one’s self or causing financial loss to another.”).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). Jed. S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ.
L. REV. 771, 779 (1980) (“The original federal mail fraud statute was enacted . . . to revise and
recodify the various laws relating to the post office.”); See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389
(1960) (noting the mail fraud statute’s “purpose was ‘to prevent the post office from being used
to carry [fraudulent schemes] into effect’” (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314
(1896)); NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA S. BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 335 (2020); C.J. Williams, What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66
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aimed to punish the sale of counterfeit currency though the United
States Mail.33 The statute’s significance “was to be based not so much
on the degree of the fraud as on the degree of misuse of the mails.”34
The perceived need for an “enlarged and dynamic federal power” in
light of the rapidly growing national economy that followed the Civil
War catalyzed the creation of the federal mail fraud statute.35 Titled
“Frauds and swindles,” the statute punishes individuals involved in
“any scheme or artifice to defraud” who, in the course of executing or
attempting this fraud, use interstate mail.
The mail fraud statute parallels its modern-day cognate—the wire
fraud statute—in all respects but one, the jurisdictional element.36
Where the mail fraud statute requires the use of the mails, the wire
fraud statute requires the use of an interstate telephone call or
electronic communication.
The federal fraud statutes have garnered wide appeal. In an oftquoted passage, federal judge and former prosecutor, Jed S. Rakoff,
described the statute as follows:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud
statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger,
our Cuisinart—our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off
with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law “darling,” but we always
come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. §1341, with its simplicity,
adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. It understands us
and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand

OKLA. L. REV. 287, 291 (2013); see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (“The
sponsor of the recodification stated, in apparent reference to the antifraud provision, that
measures were needed ‘to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by
thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people in the country.’” (quoting CONG. GLOBE , 41ST CONG., 3D SESS., 35 (1870) (remarks of
Rep. Farnsworth)).
33. C.J. Williams, What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 291
(2013).
34. Jed. S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 784 (1980).
35. Id. at 780.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018). Titled “Fraud by wire, radio, or television,” the wire fraud
statute punishes:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted
by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both . . . .
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Critics of the sweeping nature of both statutes raise federalism
concerns, arguing that frauds that are “the exclusive concern of the
States” should not be prosecuted using the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes.38 To that end, critics maintain that federal prosecutors have
invoked mail and wire fraud statutes “to impose criminal penalties
upon a staggeringly broad swath of behavior, creating uncertainty in
business negotiations and challenges to due process and federalism.”39
Federal prosecutors are simply discouraged from undertaking
regional cases—providing cold comfort to the critics.40 In truth, federal
prosecutors frequently bring mail and wire fraud cases limited to
“isolated transactions,” demonstrating the immense discretion
bestowed on federal prosecutors.41 Prosecutors have routinely used the
mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute a broad range of crimes, even
when there is barely enough interstate activity to give federal courts
jurisdiction.42 The ever-growing reach of the mail and wire fraud
statutes has added urgency to the call for a consistent and pragmatic
interpretation.
A. The Statutory Elements
Described as “the oldest federal criminal statute[s] still being used
extensively to prosecute crimes that are also within the province of
state and local law enforcement,” the mail and wire fraud statutes

37. Rakoff, supra note 27, at 771.
38. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 397 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Justice Scalia’s
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204, 1205 (2009)).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-43.100 (2018), provides:
Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme
employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals,
involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to
settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts. Serious
consideration, however, should be given to the prosecution of any scheme
which in its nature is directed to defrauding a class of persons, or the general
public, with a substantial pattern of conduct.
41. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579,
587 (2005) (“These broad provisions authorize the punishment of almost any kind of dishonest or
deceptive behavior, even when no other party has suffered any harm. Thus, mail fraud charges
have been brought against a developer for attempting to sell homes by falsely claiming that they
were good investments and against a physician for referring patients to a hospital without
disclosing to the patients that the hospital paid him a fee for the referrals.”).
42. See Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for
Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1442 (1985). (“[F]ederal prosecutors threaten to work an
‘end-run’ of a beneficial system of state corporate law by means of mail/wire fraud.”)
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extend far beyond other federal statutes.43 The elements of the two
statutory offenses are “(1) devising or participating in a scheme to
defraud, (2) commission of the act with intent to defraud, and (3) use
of the mails or wires in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.”44 Their
expansive reach has won favor with federal prosecutors, who see the
mail and wire fraud statutes as the “first line of defense” against new
areas of fraud for which Congress has not yet prohibited.45 A
characteristic of the federal fraud statutes lending to its expansive
reach is their applicability to inchoate crimes.
Both mail and wire fraud are inchoate crimes. That is, the
government need not prove that the fraudulent scheme reached
fruition for the defendant to be held accountable. Furthermore, the
jurisdictional elements of the fraud statutes have become a formality
rather than requisites of the offense.46 For application of the mail fraud
statute, any use of the federal mails, either intrastate or interstate,
affords federal jurisdiction.47 And for its modern cognate, the interstate
use of wires provides federal jurisdiction.48
The statutes’ plain meaning and legislative history are ambiguous.49
43. NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA S. BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN,
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 333 (2020).

FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

44. Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 944 (2003).
45. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See United
States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 93, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing mail fraud as an “all-purpose
prosecutorial expedient”); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 117, 126 (1981) (quoting the prosecutor’s maxim, “when in doubt, charge mail
fraud”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the ‘Evolution’
of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (arguing that the mail fraud statute
“seems destined to provide the federal prosecutor with what Archimedes long sought—a simple
fulcrum from which one can move the world”); Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute
(Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980) (noting prosecutors’ reference to the statute as “our
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart”).
46. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (“To be a part of the
execution of the fraud . . . the use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme. It
is sufficient for the mailing to be ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.’”) (quoting Badders
v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)); see generally Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just
be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435
(1995).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). The jurisdictional element relies on U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads” and
“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers”).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018). The jurisdictional element for wire fraud relies on U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
49. See United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (“In the absence of a
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Neither the text of the mail fraud statute nor its newer counterpart
defines what constitutes a scheme to defraud. Likewise, the relevant
legislative history is scant. Violent crimes are usually defined by
legislatures, whereas defining white-collar crime has largely been left
up to prosecutors and courts.50 Another commentator has observed
that “the federal law of white collar crime now seems to be judge-made
to an unprecedented degree, with courts deciding on a case-by-case,
retrospective basis whether conduct falls within often vaguely defined
legislative prohibitions.”51 Still, the courts have not been completely
left to their own devices. Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court,
Justice Byron White explained: “[T]he words ‘to defraud’ commonly
refer ‘to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or
schemes,’ and ‘usually signify the deprivation of something of value by
trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.’”52
B. The Evolving Interpretations of the Federal Fraud Statutes
Twenty-four years after its passage in 1896, the mail fraud statute
came before the Supreme Court. Tasked with interpreting “any scheme
or artifice to defraud,”53 the Court rejected the argument that the

statutory definition, the courts have provided a judicial framework for conceptualizing a
fraudulent scheme.”); United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“[N]either statute defines what a ‘scheme to defraud’ is. Instead, the meaning of ‘scheme to
defraud’ has been judicially defined.” (quoting United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1983))); see also United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 239 (4th Cir. 2005) (Gregory, J.,
dissenting) (noting “confusion in the jurisprudence surrounding the mail fraud statute leaves the
very real possibility that courts and federal prosecutors will enforce the statute in arbitrary and
unforeseeable ways”); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469, 480 (1996) (arguing that courts’ current treatment of statutes such as the
mail fraud statute “effectively transfers delegated lawmaking authority to individual
prosecutors.”); Donald V. Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 45, 47 n.3 (1980) (likening the mail fraud statute to the horrific practice of Procrustes,
who in mythology forced his guests to lie on an iron bed and then either stretched out or lopped
off their legs to make their bodies conform to the length of the bed); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud:
Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 269 (1992) (“The mail fraud statute’s uncertainty has
exceeded the bounds of mere judicial activism and entered the arena of absurdity.”).
50. J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199,
1254 (1999) (“[I]t may be that the constraints the courts have placed on law enforcement in the
criminal procedure context have led Congress to expand the scope of white collar criminal
statutes . . . [i]n this light, the task of defining white collar crime is largely left to prosecutors and
the courts.”).
51. John C. Coffee Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B. U. L. REV. 193, 198 (1991).
52. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
53. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
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statute was limited to the common law crime of false pretenses.54 This
sweeping construction freed the mail fraud statute from its common
law moorings.55 The Court looked “beyond the letter of the statute,”
stressing that “the evil sought to be remedied . . . is always significant in
determining the meaning [of the statute].”56 In doing so, the Court read
“any scheme or artifice to defraud” to include “everything designed to
defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and
promises as to the future.”57 The Court added that the “significant fact
is the intent and purpose [of the statute].”58 Congress codified the
holding of Durland v. United States in 1909.59
To prove intent, the prosecution enjoys “a liberal policy . . .
allow[ing] the government to introduce evidence that even
peripherally bears on the question of intent.”60 The government can
often prove intent through consciousness of wrongdoing.61 In practice,
intent determines criminality. And thus, the most utilized defense
strategies revolve around disproving the intent element. Good faith is
available as an affirmative defense to federal fraud. Beyond that, a
defendant can evade liability for mail and wire fraud charges by
rebutting materiality by arguing puffery, negating mens rea by arguing
innocent intent, or refuting deception by arguing that there was no
“fiduciary duty.” The question of whether the defendant knew she was
engaged in unacceptable behavior dominates fraud cases.
Treating consciousness of wrongdoing as the requisite intent
required to adjudicate fraud has its shortcomings.62 It is simultaneously
too broad, in potentially exposing morally innocent defendants to
conviction, and too narrow, in that it shields guilty defendants.
54. Id. at 312–13. ‘False pretenses’ is “[t]he crime of knowingly obtaining title to another’s
personal property by misrepresenting a fact with the intent to defraud.” False Pretenses, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 313.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357 n.6 (1987).
60. United States v. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994)).
61. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (importing
consciousness of wrongdoing into the term “corruptly” in the obstruction of justice statute);
Newman v. United States, 28 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1928) (noting that an alias may evidence
“consciousness of wrongdoing”); United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D. Md. 2011)
(holding that good faith reliance on counsel negates the necessary showing of consciousness of
wrongdoing in a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
62. For a thorough explanation of the following shortcomings, see Samuel W. Buell & Lisa
Kern Griffin, supra note 16 at 150–65.
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Consciousness of wrongdoing requires the jury to construct a
complicated inferential chain.63 The jurors must look at a defendant’s
actions and first infer that she committed the wrong she is charged with.
Second, the jurors must infer that she not only transgressed, but that
she also knew that what she was doing was wrong. In contrast, the
inferential chain for a violent crime is straightforward. The physical act
of killing another will, generally, constitute the necessary intent. At the
same time, consciousness of wrongdoing is constricted because “the
[prosecution’s] narrative overrides a more logical approach to the
evidence.”64 The desire for a sensible narrative—a story—takes
precedence. As a result, jurors are more likely to interpret a defendant’s
actions as showing consciousness of wrongdoing than they are to think
of those actions as isolated and unrelated.
Neither federal fraud statute explicitly requires proof of materiality.
Yet the Supreme Court read such a requirement in Neder v. United
States.65 It did so because at the time of the statutes’ enactment, the
word “defraud” was understood to “require[] a misrepresentation or
concealment of [a] material fact.”66 Thus, other than in an honest
services context, a “scheme to defraud” for mail or wire fraud purposes
must involve a material misrepresentation of some kind.67 “A
misrepresentation is material if it is capable of influencing the intended
victim.”68

63. Id. at 157.
64. Id. at 161. For an in-depth explanation and examination of the psychological forces that
cause the associative system to override the logical one, see Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical
Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 15 (1996).
65. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
66. United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing among others United
States v. Evans, 844 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 22-3. (“[T]he wellsettled meaning of ‘fraud’ required a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.”).
67. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 25 (“Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an
element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”); United States v. Evans,
892 F.3d 692, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (“‘Scheme to defraud’ is tricky to
define, ‘but it includes any false or fraudulent pretenses or representations intended to deceive
others in order to obtain something of value, such as money, from the entity to be deceived.’ Such
falsity must be material.”); Williams v. Affinion Group, LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2018)
(internal citations omitted) (“A ‘scheme to defraud’ is a plan to deprive a person of something of
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching. To make out such a scheme a plaintiff must
provide proof of a material misrepresentation.”); see also United States v. Roberts, 881 F.3d 1049,
1052 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018).
68. Roberts, 881 F.3d at 1052; see also Evans, 892 F.3d at 712 (internal citations omitted) (to
be material “[the fraud] must have ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing,
the decision. . . .’”; Foster, 878 F.3d at 1304; United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir.
2016).
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II. KANT’S PHILOSOPHY
An alternative to using the consciousness of wrongdoing standard
in white-collar cases to prove the defrauder’s mental state is to
universalize her conduct and judge it against her rationale. Renowned
for forming the Categorical Imperative, Kant may hold the key to
untangling the current state of fraud adjudication.69 Before a solution
is proposed, Kant’s philosophies will be considered, as they form the
bases for his derivation of the Categorical Imperative. Then, the
proposed universalization test will follow. The proposed test consists of
two elements: fiduciary duty and the principle of universalization. The
fiduciary element contemplates the extent of trust based on the
industry-specific relationship between the defendant and the victim.
Then the principle of universalizability universalizes that relationship
and the defendant’s conduct to expose the defendant’s culpability.
A. Kant’s Retributivism
Eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is one of
the fathers of retributivism.70 Kant’s retributive rationale dictates that
punishment “must in all cases be imposed only because the individual
on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime.”71 Retributivism
justifies punishment by virtue of its “symbolic significance.”72
“[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes
of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or
those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”73
69. Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu, Categorical Imperative, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 102 (2004) (“[T]he fundamental absolute formal demand (or set of
demands) on our choice of maxims or principles on which to act. He proposed a number of
formulations of the [C]ategorical [I]mperative that on the surface differ radically from one
another, although Kant himself believed that the different formulations are equivalent.”).
70. Jane Johnson, Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of
Punishment, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 291, 292 (2008) (noting that “[t]he standard view of Kant is as the
paradigmatic retributivist”) (emphasis in original); see Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance:
The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1313 (2000); Mike C. Materni, Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice, 2 BRIT. J.
AM. LEGAL STUD. 263 (2013); Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME
& JUST. 1 (2006); Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
321 (2002).
71. Clemens Schwaiger, The Theory of Obligation in Wolff, Baumgarten, and the Early Kant,
in KANT’S MORAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Karl Ameriks, Otfried Höffe, & Nicolas Walker
eds., 2009).
72. JOEL FEINBERG , DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
100 (1970).
73. Id.
OF
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There are two justifications for criminal punishment:74
utilitarianism and retributivism. Punishment, according to
utilitarianism, is but a means to an end—less crime.75 In contrast, the
retributive viewpoint sees punishment as an end in itself.76 That is, while
punishment may have the incidental effect of decreasing crime, such
effect is not the ultimate purpose of punishment. Rather, the ultimate
purpose is to punish crimes because they are morally reprehensible.
There are generally three expressions of utilitarianism77—
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence—with deterrence being
the most prominent.78 In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. declared,
“Prevention would . . . seem to be the chief and only universal purpose
of punishment.”79 American criminal jurisprudence has taken shape,
primarily, through utilitarianism.80 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged as much.81 That is, until the last quarter of the twentieth
century.82 Criminologist John Braithwaite attributes the shift towards
retributive justifications to “the realization that utilitarian …
criminology had failed to deliver on its promises.”83 This failure was
only compounded by “growing documentation of the injustices
perpetrated in the name of criminal justice.”84 Another shortcoming of
utilitarianism is that it sanctions punishing innocent people if the
effects produced are socially desirable.85
Even if utilitarianism could avoid punishing the innocent—those
74. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3, 5 (1955).
75. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 19 (2012).
76. Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 19, 20–22 (2003).
77. Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Defendants?, 61
WAYNE L. REV. 27, 40 (2015).
78. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 (2012).
79. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 46 (1951).
80. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1990).
81. BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 248
(2004).
82. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
REVIEW 1, 6 (2003); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1990).
83. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 75, at 4.
84. Id.; see Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 143–95 (2003).
85. See Igor Primorac, Utilitarianism and Self-Sacrifice of the Innocent, 38 ANALYSIS 194–
99 (1978); Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 19, 27–29 (2003); but see Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000).
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who have not done wrong—by incorporating aspects of other
justifications, it still could not avoid excessive punishment of the
guilty.86 Thus, a justification of punishment cannot rest alone on
utilitarianism. Professor Louis Michael Seidman has gone so far as to
remark, “[I]t is impossible under a utilitarian analysis to achieve the
low level of crime that society currently desires.”87 A retributive
analysis must either accompany or supplant entirely a utilitarian one.
Retributivism should not be confused with an enthusiastic
endorsement of punishment for the sake of punishment.88 Rather,
retributivism signals to a society exactly what does and does not
constitute acceptable behavior.89 Thus, allowing members of a society
to harmonize their behavior with that which is expected of them, either
by the government or the society itself.90 Kant’s retributivism does not
stop at theoretical justifications for criminal punishment.91 This Note
will demonstrate that Kant’s moral philosophies imbue countless
aspects of American criminal jurisprudence.92
86. Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 42,
48 (1979).
87. Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 315, 319 (1984).
88. See Jane Johnson, Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of
Punishment, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 291, 294 (2008)
89. Brian M. Murray, Restorative Retributivism, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 903–04 (2021).
90. Id.
91. See generally FARHAD MALEKIAN , THE MIRAGE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MENS REA (2018).
92. See TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2019) (copyright); Am. Hosp. Ass’n
v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (attributing ought implies can to Kant, opinion also
starts with ought implies can); United States v. Krul, 774 F.3d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 2014) (Griffin, J.,
concurring); United States v. Hammer, 239 F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2001); Morgan v. Illinois, 504
U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992) (capital punishment); Save Our Valley v. Sound
Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2003) (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(civil rights); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 752 , 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th 240, 300–01, 118 P.3d 451, 491 (2005), as modified
(Oct. 12, 2005), and abrogated by People v. McKinnon, 52 Cal. 4th 610, 259 P.3d 1186 (2011)
(sentencing); Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1105 n.17 (9th Cir. 2007); State v. Santiago, 318
Conn. 1, 101–02, 122 A.3d 1, 63–64 (2015) (sentencing and punishment and capital punishment);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2610–19
(1997) (international law); See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 290 (1970)
(copyright); Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17–21
(2006) (criminal law and punishment); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh,
The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003) (federal sentencing guidelines); Gary T. Schwartz,
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801 (1997) (tort law); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (property law); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony
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Kant’s belief in retributive punishment coalesces with his beliefs
about the inherent moral force of law. Kant believed that the moral law
is derived non-empirically from the very structure of practical reason
itself (its form); and because all rational agents share the same practical
reason, the moral law binds and obligates everyone equally.93
This moral law that universally obligates all rational agents is
determined by the Categorical Imperative.94 According to Kant, the
Categorical Imperative stood for the general principle that demands
that one respect the humanity in oneself and in others, that one not
make an exception for oneself when deliberating about how to act.95 In
general, the Categorical Imperative means that one should only act in
accordance with rules that everyone could and should obey.96
B. Kant’s Universalizability Principle
1. Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives
The Categorical Imperative can be best understood in contrast with
hypothetical imperatives.97 In their most basic form, imperatives are
and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1635 n.350 (1998) (expert testimony); H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Giving, Selling, and Having Taken: Conflicting Views of Organ Transfer,
1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 29 (2004) (organ transfer); R. G. Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in
Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271 (2002); Jason
R. Steffen, Criminalization: A Kantian View, 12 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 27 (2019).
93. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann trans., 2012) (emphasis added).
94. Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu, Categorical Imperative, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY
OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 102 (2004) (“[T]he fundamental absolute formal demand (or set of
demands) on our choice of maxims or principles on which to act. He proposed a number of
formulations of the Categorical Imperative that on the surface differ radically from one another,
although Kant himself believed that the different formulations are equivalent.”).
95. For a detailed discussion, see Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, “Kant’s Moral
Philosophy”, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5 (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
Spring ed. 2022) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.
96. But see William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern
Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 75 (Tom L. Beauchamp
& Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed., 1993) (parenthetical – insert parenthetical); John Hasnas, The
Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 19, 25–28
(1998); John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (2005);
John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 723 (1982).
97. Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu, Hypothetical Imperative, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY
OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 317 (2004) (explaining a form of command issued by the will, in
contrast to another form of command, the Categorical Imperative. In his account of morality, the
fundamental role is assigned to Categorical Imperatives rather than to hypothetical imperatives.
While the Categorical Imperative commands an action as an objective necessity in itself, without
regard to any inclination or end, a hypothetical imperative commands an action as the means for
satisfying some inclination or purpose).
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“moral commands for determining an action in accordance with a
certain principle of the will.”98 Hypothetical imperatives come in the
form of if-then statements, with an antecedent and a consequent.99 In
other words, hypothetical imperatives are conditional. The following is
an example: “If you want to pass the bar, you ought to study criminal
law.” If Person A does not want to pass the bar, then the imperative (or
the command) that he study criminal law does not apply to him.
In contrast to hypothetical imperatives, a Categorical Imperative is
applied to everyone and is not conditional. The following is an example:
“You ought not to make false promises.”100 The imperative (or the
command) of not making false promises applies to Person A whether
he wants it to or not. The supreme principle of categorical imperatives
is called the Categorical Imperative.101 Kant thought that there ought
to only be one such principle to avoid conflicting duties. Kant
formulated four variations102 of the Categorical Imperative.103 They are
The Formula of Universal Law, The Formula of Humanity, The
Formula of Autonomy, and The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends.104 Of

98. Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu, Imperative, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 333 (2004).
99. Consider the following example of a modus ponens argument pattern: Major premise: P
→Q (i.e., if P then Q); Minor premise: P; Conclusion: Q. In the major premise, what is left of the
arrow is called the antecedent and what is right of the arrow is called the consequent.
100. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33–34 (Mary
Gregor & Jens Timmermann trans., 2012).
101. A. T. Nuyen, Counting the Formulas of the Categorical Imperative: One Plus Three
Makes Four, 10 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY 37–48 (1993)(noting how “the situation
seems to be this: either the different formulas, three or five as the case may be, are irreconcilable
and thus an embarrassment to Kant, or they are fundamentally the same and thus an
embarrassment to us who cannot reconcile them”).
102. Some scholars count three, some four, and some count five formulations in the
Groundwork. The reason some scholars count these five versions differently is that they combine
the various formulations in differing arrangements.
103. Note that Kant’s four formulations are still consistent with the notion that there is only
one Categorical Imperative. There is only one Categorical Imperative. Kant merely articulated
four formulations of it. See Paton, H. J. , 1947, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s
Moral Philosophy, London: Hutchinson’s University Library; David Misselbrook, Duty, Kant,
and Deontology, 63 BR J GEN PRACT 211 (2013); Sven Nyholm, Kant’s Universal Law Formula
Revisited, 46 METAPHILOSOPHY 280–99 (2015); Richard Mccarty, Kant’s Derivation of the
Formula of Universal Law, 49 DIALOGUE 113–33 (2010).
104. Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is the Formula of Universal Law,
which states, “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal
law of nature.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33–34
(Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann trans., 2012). Kant’s second formulation is the Formula of
Humanity, which states “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end.” Id. at 44–45 (Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann trans., 2012). Kant’s third formulation is
the Autonomy Formula, which states, “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as
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principal importance for white-collar crime is the formula of universal
law.
2. Formula of Universal Law
The formula of universal law is Kant’s first formulation of the
Categorical Imperative, commanding people to “act only in accordance
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law.”105 Maxims have the form “I will do A if that
will make me happy.” Thus, a maxim is akin to a principle upon which
one acts. For Kant, there are maxims of action and maxims of ends.106
In short, maxim can mean both principle and motive. The principle is in
one sense formal: that is, it commands nothing specific. At the same
time, it is synthetic because it is acquired after a priori deliberation.
One’s maxim is her reason for acting. Simply put, the formula of
universal law says that one should only act for those reasons which have
the following characteristic: you can act according to a self-imposed
rule that you can at the same time will that everyone obey.
The formula of universal law can be best understood by looking at
Kant’s discussion of an action that violates the formula of universal law.
Consider the following: Person A is suffering financial difficulties and
considers “borrowing” money, knowing that he can never repay. Person
A’s maxim then would be something to the extent of “make false
promises.” Universalizing (i.e., applying the formula of universal law to
the maxim) renders promises impossible.107 That is, Kant concludes, if
acting in accordance with the maxim of making false promises became
widespread, then there would be no such thing as promises anymore.108
The contradiction lies here. Person A needs promises to exist because
otherwise, how could he falsely promise to borrow money? If we were
to universalize Person A’s maxim—to will the universal breaking of
making universal law through its maxims.” ID. AT [PAGE #] Finally, Kant’s fourth formulation is
the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, which states, “So act as if you were through your maxims a
law-making member of a kingdom of ends.” Kingdom of Ends” The formulation states that we
must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible
kingdom of ends.” ID. AT 50–51.
105. Id. at 33–34.
106. See infra III.B.1. Maxim of action parallels a Categorical Imperative and maxim of end
parallels a hypothetical imperative.
107. See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 97, at 34-35
(“[T]he universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could
promise what he please with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and
the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but
would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense.”)
108. Id. at 34–38.
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promises—we would simultaneously be willing the abandonment of
promising.
III. UNIVERSALIZABILITY OF FRAUD: THE FORMULA OF
UNIVERSAL LAW APPLIED TO FRAUD
A. The Elements
The universalization of fraud would involve two steps: determining
the “fiduciary duty” (the antecedent) and universalizing the
defendant’s conduct (universalizing). In the ordinary course of a fraud
trial, however, the prosecutor already must meet the first step. Thus, this
new method therefore only involves one additional step.
First, the prosecutor must define the scope of the “fiduciary duty,”
as they already do.109 The concepts of a fiduciary duty and a fiduciary
relationship (and all of their nuances) encompass “corporate law’s
most mandatory inner core.”110 Admittedly, using the term “fiduciary
duty” to encapsulate all those nuances betrays what it is supposed to
capture, thereby trivializing the “most mandatory inner core.”111 As
applied in the corporate crime context, the idea of a fiduciary duty in
white-collar crime is better captured as a fiduciary relationship.112
109. For an extensive discussion, see generally Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31 (2010).
110. John C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1621 (1989).
111. The term “fiduciary duty” suggests an all-encompassing corporate obligation befitting
any and all fiduciary-trustee relationships. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019). A duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as an
agent or a trustee) to the beneficiary (such as the agent’s principal or the beneficiaries of the
trust); a duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as a
lawyer or corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such as a lawyer’s client or a shareholder); a duty
to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best
interests of the other person (such as the duty that one partner owes to another). For example,
directors have a duty not to engage in self-dealing to further their own personal interests rather
than the interests of the corporation. That could not be farther from the reality of mail and wire
fraud adjudications. See, e.g., Gomez-Jimenez v. New York L. Sch., 103 A.D.3d 13, 956 N.Y.S.2d
54 (2012); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d
143 (2d Cir. 2008); Ivey v. Genting Casinos UK Ltd. t/a Crockfords Club [2014] EWHC 3394
(QB); United States v. Regent Off. Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Weimert, 819 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015); United
States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Gramins, 939 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2019);
see also Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 38
(2010) (noting that “[f]iduciary duty . . . is simply a label used to designate relationships in which
one party’s expectations about disclosure make nondisclosure more likely to produce a deception
that the law of fraud might want to sanction as wrongful.”).
112. The relationship is understood as
A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of
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Whereas jurors looking at the relationship between a corporate
officer and an investor must take on a fact-specific analysis in
answering the question, jurors looking at a corporate officer’s fiduciary
duty can decide the issue absent a similar factual inquiry. This is so
because “when the law has not confronted a particular question of
relationship or duty, prior recognitions of relationships and duties . . .
serve as a starting point for analysis.”113 Tort law has recognized many
fiduciary duties.114 And there is a danger of carrying the term “fiduciary
duty” and its ensuing definitions into criminal law.115
To determine the scope of the fiduciary relationship, the prosecutor
must answer several questions. First, what is the market in which the
defendant is operating? Second, what is the nature of the relationship
between the victim and the alleged defrauder? Third, with what kinds
of expectations and assumptions is the victim coming into the
transaction with the alleged defrauder? Answering these questions
gives the jury a deeper and more meaningful insight into the
defendant’s mind. This kind of insight is crucial to the white-collar
inquiry, given that the question of criminality hinges almost entirely on
the defendant’s mental state.116
To universalize the defendant’s conduct would be to show that the
defendant herself would object to everyone acting similarly. If she
would not accept this, she possesses the predicate mental state. Once
the prosecutor has demonstrated a fiduciary relationship, she must
apply Kant’s principles—essentially universalizing the defendant’s

another on matters within the scope of the relationship. Fiduciary
relationships — such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, principal-agent,
and attorney-client — require an unusually high degree of care. Fiduciary
relationships usu. arise in one of four situations: (1) when one person places
trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains superiority or
influence over the first, (2) when one person assumes control and
responsibility over another, (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give
advice to another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship, or
(4) when there is a specific relationship that has traditionally been recognized
as involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and a client or a stockbroker
and a customer.
Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
113. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1986 (2006).
114. For a thorough analysis of ‘fiduciary duty’ as used in tort law see Deborah A. DeMott,
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006).
115. Fiduciary duty as applied in tort law is judged against the “preponderance of evidence”
standard, which is substantially lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that a
similar concept would be judged against in the white-collar crime jurisprudence.
116. See supra I.B.1.
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conduct. To be clear, this analysis does not displace the mens rea
element. The prosecutor must still prove that the defendant acted with
“specific intent” to defraud.117 What the universalization analysis does,
however, is simplify the job of the prosecutor, the court, and most
importantly, the jury.
To take a simple example, say a corporate CEO exaggerates the
financial well-being of her company in quarterly reports to make the
company’s performance look better. She certainly would not tolerate
this behavior in others: If all companies lied on their filings, then stock
prices would be inherently untrustworthy, and the stock market would
likely collapse. The CEO’s behavior, therefore, fails Kant’s
universalizability test. According to this test, she would have the
requisite mens rea for a mail or wire fraud violation. The functionality
of the universalizability principle is not limited to simple thought
experiments. Applying it to the Holmes case illustrates its practicality.
B. The Application: Elizabeth Holmes
Founded in 2003, Theranos was set to disrupt traditional
healthcare.118 Nineteen-year-old Elizabeth Holmes, starting her
fledgling company, found support in her advisor and Dean of the
School of Engineering at Stanford University, Channing Robertson.119
Robertson introduced her to venture capitalists.120 In March 2004,

117. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Charles K. Whitebread, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail and
Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.02
(Otto Obermaier et al., eds. 2016) (need explanatory parenthetical) Although the prosecutor
must establish that the defendant acted with “specific intent,” indirect and circumstantial
evidence is admissible and may support an inference that the defendants intended to work an
injury. Sometimes, however, this liberality permits the jury to infer a specific intent to defraud
from the fact that the injury did in fact result and was foreseeable. Once the fact of injury can be
used to prove an intent to injure, the independent significance of the mens rea element begins to
fade rapidly.
118. Roger Parloff, This CEO Is Out for Blood, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 7:37 AM),
https://fortune.com/2014/06/12/theranos-blood-holmes; Caitlin Roper, This Woman Invented a
Way To Run 30 Lab Tests on Only One Drop of Blood, WIRED (Feb. 18, 2014, 1:30 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/02/elizabeth-holmes-theranos/?cid=18964974; Laura ArrillagaAndreessen, Five Visionary Tech Entrepreneurs Who Are Changing the World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/12/t-magazine/elizabeth-holmes-techvisionaries-brian-chesky.html?_r=1; Sheelah Kolhatkar & Caroline Chen, Can Elizabeth Holmes
(Dec.
10,
2015,
5:00
AM),
Save
Her
Unicorn?,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–12–10/can-theranos-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-fendoff-her-critics-.
119. Nick Bolton, Exclusive: How Elizabeth Holmes’s House of Cards Came Tumbling
Down, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabeth-holmestheranos-exclusive.
120. Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014),
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Holmes dropped out of Stanford to dedicate all of her time and energy
to her company.121 That year, Holmes raised almost $7 million in early
funding, which garnered a $30 million valuation for Theranos.122
Theranos grew quickly, and in 2013, the company went public. Until
then, little was known about Theranos, let alone about its founder. But
in September 2013, the company announced its partnership with
Walgreens and, in doing so, it received much public attention—
attention, and scrutiny, that would ultimately lead to its downfall.123
In the government’s indictment against Holmes, prosecutors
alleged two theories of fraud: one to defraud investors and another to
defraud doctors and patients.124 The first theory is discussed here. The
government asserted that Holmes made misstatements about
Theranos’s technology. For example, Theranos represented to its
shareholders and potential investors that its proprietary analyzer was
“presently capable of accomplishing certain tasks, such as performing
the full range of clinical tests using small blood samples drawn from a
finger stick and producing results that were more accurate and reliable
than those yielded by conventional methods—all at a faster speed than
previously possible.”125 The reality was that its proprietary analyzer has

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/blood-simpler; Avery Hartmans & Sarah
Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Elizabeth Holmes, the Former Theranos CEO Found Guilty of Wire
Fraud and Conspiracy Who Is the Subject of the New Hulu Series ‘The Dropout’, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2022, 1:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-founder-ceoelizabeth-holmes-life-story-bio-2018–4#as-a-sophomore-holmes-went-to-one-of-her-professorschanning-robertson-and-said-lets-start-a-company-with-his-blessing-she-founded-real-timecures-later-changing-the-companys-name-to-theranos-thanks-to-a-typo-early-employeespaychecks-actually-said-real-time-curses-10.
121. Sara Ashley O’Brien, The Rise and Fall of Elizabeth Holmes: A Timeline, CNN (Jan. 4,
2022,
11:00
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/04/tech/elizabeth-holmes-rise-andfall/index.html.
122. Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/blood-simpler.
123. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, This CEO Is Out for Blood, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 7:37 AM),
https://fortune.com/2014/06/12/theranos-blood-holmes; Profile: Elizabeth Holmes, FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/profile/elizabeth-holmes/?sh=1db023e547a7; Kimberly Weisul, How
Playing the Long Game Made Elizabeth Holmes a Billionaire, INC. (Feb. 3, 2022),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201510/kimberly-weisul/the-longest-game.html; Laura ArrillagaAndreessen, Five Visionary Tech Entrepreneurs Who Are Changing the World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/12/t-magazine/elizabeth-holmes-techvisionaries-brian-chesky.html?_r=1; John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With
Its Blood-Test Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranoshas-struggled-with-blood-tests-1444881901.
124. Indictment, United States v. Holmes, 2021 WL 2044470 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2021),
available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/cases-of-interest/usa-v-holmes-etal/USA-v.-Holmes-18-CR-00258-Dkt-469-Third-Sup-Indictment.pdf.
125. Id. at *4.
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accuracy and reliability issues, performed only a fraction of the tests,
and was slower than competing devices.126 Likewise, Holmes misled
investors as to Theranos’s well-being, the securing of a Walgreens
partnership, and the company’s relationship with the Department of
Defense.127
This case exemplifies the labyrinthine analysis that the
consciousness of wrongdoing standard requires from prosecutors,
courts, jurors, and defendants. The universalizability principle affords
clarity not only to the courts and prosecutors but also, and more
importantly, to defendants. A court applying this principle could avoid
the pitfalls associated with deciding a defendant’s mental state and in
its stead rely solely on the defendant’s actions and her beliefs.128 Jurors
would have to look at Holmes’ conduct and conduct a subjective
inquiry, asking if her actions reflect a consciousness of wrongdoing. The
subjective nature of this inquiry needs a deeper understanding of
Holmes as a person. For jurors to decide that her actions reflect an
understanding of her wrongdoing, they must have a baseline to judge
against. The need for a baseline is where consciousness of wrongdoing
as a standard fails.
Additional information about the defendant is a double-edged
sword. One possibility is that the ancillary biographical information
sways jurors in favor of Holmes by justifying her conduct. The current
jurisprudence risks jurors concluding that she really was trying to
change the way patients had their blood drawn, that she really believed
in the technology’s potential, or that she really was trying her best. At
the other end, further biographical facts can strengthen the
prosecution’s story, playing into the juror’s desire for a cohesive
narrative.
Yet the Kantian standard avoids all of the above. Universalizing the
fraud at issue in the Holmes case is a more practical alternative to the
above. The prosecutor would first have to prove that Holmes’
representations were, in fact, false. By simply eliciting testimony that,
for example, Theranos’s proprietary analyzer was capable of running
only twelve out of the more than 1,000 of tests Holmes claimed it could,
the prosecutor would satisfy this step or that she had been using

126. Id.
127. United States v. Holmes, 2021 WL 2044470 at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2021).
128. See Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of
Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2012).
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Siemens machines to run her tests.129 Then, the prosecutor must show
that Holmes assumed a degree of regulatory compliance from
companies and organizations with which she collaborated. The
prosecutor would universalize Holmes’ conduct. To do this, the
prosecutor could elicit testimony from representatives of those entities
about the representations they make regarding their business and the
consequences of noncompliance with those regulations. For example,
the prosecutor could call a representative of Siemens to testify on the
topic of regulatory compliance and the consequences of
noncompliance akin to Theranos’s misconduct with respect to the
Siemens analyzer. Finally, the prosecutor would show, through the cross
of the defendant, through testimony from those close to her, or through
closing arguments how Holmes’ assumptions and expectations
contradict her conduct. If Holmes would disapprove of other CEOs in
the industry lying to investors then Holmes has violated Kant’s
Categorical Imperative.
C. The Value
Try to imagine the defendant’s life as a massive puzzle. Each piece
is an act of the defendant. The jury’s job is not to assemble every piece
of the defendant’s life. Rather, the jury need only assemble the pieces
relevant to the proceeding at hand. The consciousness of wrongdoing
standard asks jurors to do two analyses. First, they must look at the
scattered mess of individual puzzle pieces and, without showing them
the whole picture, pick out the pieces they think will fit. Then, they must
make conjectures as to how those pieces fit—using guesswork with a
hodgepodge of information—while trying to connect the pieces.
Universalizing fraud takes much of the guesswork out of the
calculus. Applying the formula of universal law to fraud, the prosecutor
and the defendant not only give the pertinent puzzle pieces to the
jurors, they also describe what those pieces will or will not show.
Companies usually want to act in conformity with the law, and they
have good reason to.130 Their success is predicated on their compliance
with the law. The universalizability principle makes that easier to
achieve. The interest in knowing the nuances of the fraud statutes is
129. Tim De Chant, Holmes Claimed Theranos Could Do “More Than 1,000 Tests”—It Did
12, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 19, 2021), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/11/holmes-claimedtheranos-could-do-more-than-1000-tests-it-did-12/.
130. David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?, 53 GA. L. REV. 495, 498
(2019) (emphasis added).
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shared because “companies want to know precisely what activity might
subject them to liability.”131 In other words, if companies survey the law,
it is not necessarily because they have devious purposes. What is more,
if criminal jurisprudence were to proceed with that kind of assumption,
it would be at a standstill—for every rule it could formulate, it would
produce double loopholes. Courts have always been aware of the dual
justifications of criminal punishment.132 For example, Judge Denny
Chin, citing symbolism, denied reducing Bernie Madoff’s sentencing
because his life expectancy was low.133 Judge Chin underscores the
retributive justification for punishment—that punishment should be
proportional to the actor’s moral culpability.134 A final benefit is to the
rest of society. Individuals “want to know precisely what activity might
subject them to liability.”135 Such a principle would make the fraud
statutes more salient to the general public.
CONCLUSION
Fraud is an ever-growing concept, and the statutory language is
meant to reflect that. It is meant to leave enough breathing room to
accommodate future fraudulent schemes that are currently out of
reach. Yet, without understanding the moral underpinnings of fraud,
the mail and wire fraud statutes can be broadened and narrowed on a
131. Id.
132. United States v. Gramins, 939 F.3d 429, 455 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The fact that the JPMAC
trade postdated the Litvak indictment provided strong evidence for Gramins’s consciousness of
wrongdoing.”); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 698 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that
defendant’s efforts to enlist another to conceal prior misrepresentations undermined any claim of
inadequate notice in prosecution under flexible mail-fraud statute); Transcript of Sentencing
Hearing at 46–47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2012/04/16/062909sentencing.pdf.
133. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009)
134. Judge Chin said:
One of the traditional notions of punishment is that an offender should be
punished in proportion to his blameworthiness. Here, the message must be
sent that Mr. Madoff’s crimes were extraordinarily evil, and that this kind of
irresponsible manipulation of the system is not merely a bloodless financial
crime that takes place just on paper, but that it is instead, as we have heard,
one that takes a staggering human toll. The symbolism is important because
the message must be sent that in a society governed by the rule of law, Mr.
Madoff will get what he deserves, and that he will be punished according to
his moral culpability.
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213 (S.D.N.Y. June
29, 2009).
135. David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?, 53 GA. L. REV. 495, 498
(2019).
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whim. The formula of universal law as applied to fraud simplifies things
and reaches just results. It incorporates principles rooted in the
foundation of the fraud statutes and provides a rule of law that can be
uniformly applied by courts and easily understood by juries,
defendants, and prosecutors.

